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1 Introduction
Survey measures of inflation expectations are closely followed by most central
banks and are often used to examine expectations formation.1 Even so, we know
very little about how macro models fit survey data. Del Negro and Eusepi (2011)
show that a dynamic general equilibrium (DSGE) model equipped with several
frictions and exogenous shocks solved under rational expectations (RE), although it
fits macro data well, is misspecified in fitting the dynamics of survey expectations.
This paper examines whether a DSGE model with adaptive learning can fit
macro and survey data simultaneously . We use inflation survey data along with
other macro variables to estimate the New Keynesian model of Smets and Wouters
(2007) (SW), which is widely used by central banks for monetary policy analysis.
We conduct Bayesian model comparison to contrast RE and constant-gain adaptive
learning: agents form expectations about forward looking variables by estimating
linear models, using a constant-gain learning algorithm to update the parameters
as new data becomes available. We aim to understand which expectation formation
fits actual data best.
Using survey data in the estimation is a more salient issue under adaptive
learning than under RE, because learning can be modeled in many ways. In an
RE model, like Del Negro and Eusepi (2011), the expectations are a function of the
model parameters and using inflation survey data can only affect the identification
of the parameters. In an adaptive learning model the dynamics of endogenous vari-
ables depend on how learning is modeled. Several papers document that adaptive
learning can enhance the propagation mechanism of the DSGE models and gener-
ate the persistence that is otherwise caused by either nominal frictions or by the
dynamics of the exogenous stochastic processes. However adaptive learning can be
criticized because the importance of different frictions changes depending on how
learning is modeled. Milani (2007), (2011) and Slobodyan and Wouters (2012)
all model learning in a different way and find different frictions to be important.
To respond to this criticism we use survey data to impose an additional consis-
tency requirement: the learning algorithm should be chosen consistently with the
observed survey data.
Our main result is that in estimations without survey data the adaptive learn-
ing and the RE model perform similarly in fitting macro data, but when we require
the model to fit survey data as well, the learning model clearly outperforms the
RE model. In other words, there is information in the survey data that helps
to differentiate between the different models of expectation formation. The rea-
son behind our main result is that our benchmark specification for learning is a
small (underparametrized) forecasting model: agents condition their expectations
1See Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010), Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004).
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on a reduced information set compared to RE. This small forecasting model pro-
vides more time variability of inflation expectations and therefore more flexibility
than RE and fits survey expectations better. This flexibility becomes apparent
when we examine how the model-implied inflation expectations change when we
include survey data among the observables. Expectations change substantially
under learning, whereas in the RE model the model-implied inflation expectations
are hardly affected. As a result, in estimations with survey data learning captures
the time pattern of the survey better than RE. We further find that big advantage
of using survey data in the estimations is that it helps to avoid unrealistic jumps
in model-implied inflation expectations.
We also show that the superior performance of the learning model is robust to
making changes to the small forecasting model of inflation expectations. However,
it is important that the learning model should be small. When we increase the
model size, assuming that the agents’ information set is consistent with the RE
equilibrium, the dynamics of the learning model stay close to RE and the log
marginal likelihood decreases. A small forecasting model, on the other hand, is
misspecified compared to RE, as a consequence the implied model dynamics are
different from those of the RE model.
Besides having a small forecasting model, the time variability of expectations
is also important. The likelihood decreases when we reestimate the model us-
ing a learning algorithm with less time variability (decreasing-gain learning). In
this case, initial conditions have a long lasting impact on expectations, therefore
learning cannot capture episodes with large changes.
Some researchers have already pointed out the advantage of modeling learning
agents with small forecasting models because it either improves DSGE models’
ability to fit macro data (Slobodyan and Wouters (2012), Orphanides and Williams
(2005)), or approximates inflation survey data well (Branch and Evans (2006)). We
show that modeling inflation expectations with a small learning model in a DSGE
framework can deliver both at the same time: provide a good fit to macro data as
well as observed inflation expectations.
There are only a handful of researchers who estimate macro models using data
on expectations as an observable. Closest to our paper is the study by Del Negro
and Eusepi (2011) which uses survey data in estimating a DSGE model exclusively
under RE. It shows that survey data contains useful information to differentiate
between different informational assumptions about the inflation target.2 Milani
(2011) uses survey data to show that expectation shocks, derived from the differ-
ence between survey data and an adaptive learning algorithm, can explain a major
part of business cycle fluctuations. Finally, Carboni and Ellison (2009) use inter-
2Del Negro and Eusepi (2011) compare full information and imperfect information RE models
with fixed ant time varying inflation target.
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nal unemployment rate forecasts of the Federal Reserve in estimating the model
of Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2004). Even though their focus is different from
that of our paper, they also find that using data of expectations removes volatile
and unrealistic beliefs implied by the model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we summarize
the main features of the model and characterize the model’s solution under both
RE and learning. Section 3 presents estimation details. In section 4 we select the
benchmark learning model for inflation expectations, describe our main estimation
results and the posterior parameter estimates together with impulse-responses.
Section 5 contains robustness exercises and section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Our estimation is based on a medium scale New Keynesian model with price and
wage rigidities, capital accumulation, investment adjustment costs, variable capital
utilization, and habit formation. The model we estimate is identical to that of SW,
main innovation of our paper is to extend the SW dataset by survey expectations
and examine the private sector’s expectation formation.
2.1 Model participants, main frictions and forward vari-
ables
In this section we give a short overview of the model without stating the equations;
the detailed version can be found in the Online Appendix. Readers interested in
more details of the model are encouraged to refer to SW.
The New Keynesian model of SW is based on a neoclassical growth model
augmented with several frictions. The model consists of utility maximizing house-
holds, profit maximizing firms (intermediate and final goods producers), a labor
union setting wages and a monetary authority.
Households : The economy is populated with a continuum of households with
identical preferences that depend on hours worked and consumption. There is an
external habit formation: consumption enters relative to aggregate lagged con-
sumption. Households can move resources between periods by purchasing one-
period bonds and renting capital to firms. The Euler equation describes the
dynamics of consumption: consumption depends on past consumption because
of habit formation, on expected future consumption because consumers prefer
to smooth consumption, on expected growth in hours worked because of non-
separable preferences and on the ex-ante real interest rate of bonds that reflects
intertemporal substitution of consumption. Households make a capital accumu-
lation decision, and decide how many units of capital services to rent to firms.
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Capital adjustment is costly, it is a function of the change in investment. The
households’ optimal investment choice is a function of past and expected future
investment and the real value of the existing capital stock. The arbitrage condition
for the value of the capital stock implies that this stock reacts positively to both
its expected future value and the expected future real rental rate of capital, and
negatively to the ex-ante real interest rate.
Firms: There is a continuum of firms that combine capital and labor to produce
differentiated intermediate goods. The model exhibits price rigidity a la Calvo
(1983); therefore firms choose their price knowing it will impact future profits.
When firms cannot re-optimize their prices, they index them to past inflation.
The Phillips curve of the economy is: aggregate price is a function of current and
expected future marginal costs and because of indexation it is also determined by
the past inflation rate. The marginal cost, in turn, is a function of the wage and
the rental rate of capital.
Labor union: In order to introduce wage rigidity, SW introduce an intermediate
labor union, that “breaks up” households’ homogenous labor supply into monop-
olistically differentiated labor services. The union then sets wages to maximize
net present value of wages, taking into account the wage rigidity (Calvo-type) and
the households’ optimal decisions. After wages are set, a separate sector called
labor packers buys labor from the unions, repackages it into a homogenous labor
service and resells it to the intermediate goods producers. Wages that are not re-
optimized in a given period are indexed to past inflation. Aggregate wages depend
on past inflation because of indexation, on expected future nominal wages because
of wage rigidity, on past wages because of habit formation and on a wage mark-up
which is a consequence of differentiated labor.
Monetary policy: The central bank is modeled with a Taylor rule: the interest
rate is adjusted in response to inflation and to changes in the level of output.
This Taylor rule is slightly different from SW, where it is a function of the output
gap3; we decided to follow the recommendations of Slobodyan and Wouters (2009)
and use output growth instead. This significantly reduces the number of forward
variables, because one does not have to estimate a parallel economy under flexible
prices. Slobodyan and Wouters (2009) find that this modification of the Taylor rule
is innocuous in the sense that it does not change the original parameter estimates
of SW.
To sum up , the model contains 13 endogenous variables: output, consumption,
investment, value of the capital stock, installed stock of capital, stock of capital,
inflation, capital utilization rate, real rental rate on capital, real marginal cost, real
wages, hours worked and interest rate. In addition, seven exogenous autoregressive
3i.e., the difference between the output obtained under nominal rigidities and under flexible
prices
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processes are introduced, with each including an iid-normally distributed error: 1)
total factor productivity (in the production function), 2) investment-specific tech-
nology (in the investment equation), 3) risk premium (represents a wedge between
the interest rate controlled by the central bank and the return on assets held by
the households), 4) exogenous spending (in the aggregate resource constraint), 5)
price mark-up (in the Phillips curve), 6) wage mark-up (in the aggregate wage
equation) and 7) a monetary policy shock (in the Taylor rule).
The model is detrended with respect to the deterministic growth rate of the
labor-augmenting technological progress and linearized around the steady-state of
the detrended variables. The set of equations that describe the dynamics of this
model can be assembled into the following two equations:
Θ0E˜tYt+1 + Θ1Yt + Θ2Yt−1 + Ψet = 0 (1)
et = Γeet−1 + Γεεt, (2)
where Y is a vector containing the 13 endogenous variables of the model, e is
the vector of the 7 exogenous shocks, and ε is the vector of iid-normal innova-
tions. E˜t(·) denotes expectations which are not necessarily rational. The matrices
Θ0,Θ1,Θ2 and Ψ contain the non-linear combinations of the model parameters.
Zero elements of Θ0 and Θ2 correspond to variables that are not present in the
model with lagged or expected future values (see Online Appendix.). Γe is a diag-
onal matrix that contains the autoregressive coefficients of the exogenous shocks.
Since almost all innovations are independent, Γε is an identity matrix except for
one off-diagonal element: in the estimations we assume that productivity innova-
tion can affect the spending shocks.4
2.2 The Rational Expectation solution
When we estimate the model under RE, we assume that private agents have perfect
knowledge about the model, its parameters and the true stochastic processes of
the economy. We use Uhlig (1999) to solve (1)-(2).5 We focus on determinate
RE solutions, and restrict the parameter space accordingly. The resulting law of
motion takes the following form:
Yt = Φ
RE
1 Yt−1 + Φ
RE
2 et−1 + Φ
RE
3 εt. (3)
4We follow SW to introduce this off-diagonal element because exogenous spending data in-
cludes net exports, which may be affected by domestic productivity developments.
5Alternative solution algorithms can be found in Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Binder and
Pesaran (1997),Christiano (2002) and Sims (2002).
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2.3 The adaptive learning solution
The second expectation formation we examine is adaptive learning in the sense
of Bray (1982), Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
Adaptive learning is popular in estimations of structural models because it often
improves the model fit of standard RE models.6 This departure from RE is often
motivated by the argument that the level of cognitive ability and computational
skill required by the RE assumption is too high.
Adaptive learning agents behave like econometricians and use estimations to
forecast future variables. We assume that agents estimate a linear function con-
sistent with the RE solution (3). They estimate a system of linear equations
Yt = βtXt−1 + ε
y
t , where βt is a matrix of coefficient estimates and Xt−1 includes
lagged values of those endogenous variables Y and exogenous shocks e that agents
use in their estimations. In practice, agents might not use all endogenous variables
and exogenous shocks. The precise choice of regressors is described in Section 4.1.7
Agents generate forecasts in the following way. At time t they use data up to
time t − 1, and obtain coefficient estimates βt−1, they then forecast the vector of
endogenous variables as
ELSt Yt+1 = βt−1Xt, (4)
where ELSt (·) denotes expectations of learning agents. We assume that agents
observe contemporaneous data, therefore Xt includes contemporaneous values of
the regressors.8
We assume that agents update their coefficient estimates with a constant gain
least squares (CG-LS)
βt = βt−1 + gR−1t Xt−1(Yt − βt−1Xt−1)′ (5)
Rt = Rt−1 + g(Xt−1X ′t−1 −Rt−1), (6)
where Rt is the variance covariance matrix of the stacked regressors and g ∈ [0, 1)
is the constant-gain tracking parameter. It can be shown that when the sample
is large enough, these recursions approximate the exponentially weighted least
squares estimate.9 The higher the constant-gain parameter g the more responsive
6See for example Slobodyan and Wouters (2009), Milani (2007).
7In the estimations we assume that agents also use a constant. In the RE solution of the
model there is no constant, in the data, however, detrended variables might not have a zero
average, and this can be captured by including a constant. See more about this in section 3,
which describes the estimation.
8The same timing assumption is used in Canova and Gambetti (2010). Alternatively, one
could assume that at time t agents only observe Yt−1. Del Negro and Eusepi (2011) examine
different timing assumptions and found that their model fit is not affected by the timing assump-
tion. A consequence of our timing assumption is that after substituting (4) into (1), Yt appears
on both sides, therefore in the estimations we have to rearrange these equations.
9See Sargent (1999).
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is the coefficient estimate β to new data. Therefore a high gain parameter helps
to track structural changes but, at the same time, it does not filter the noise from
the data as well.10 We believe constant-gain learning is a desirable way to model
expectations because it fits US surveys well and at the same time it provides good
forecasts of macro data (see Branch and Evans (2006)).11
After substituting (4) into (1) and rearranging we get the equilibrium under
learning
Yt = Φ
LS
1,t−1Yt−1 + Φ
LS
2,t−1et−1 + Φ
LS
3,t−1εt. (7)
The matrices ΦLS1,t−1,Φ
LS
2,t−1,Φ
LS
3,t−1 depend on the model coefficients and the coeffi-
cient estimates βt−1. Since βt−1 is re-estimated in each time period, its presence
introduces time-variability into the coefficient matrices of (7).
3 Data and estimation details
In this section we describe the dataset (3.1), estimation details under RE and
adaptive learning (3.2) and the Bayesian estimation (3.3).
3.1 Data
We estimate the SW model on United States (US) data. For comparability we use
the same dataset as SW, but we extend it with survey expectations of inflation.
Our quarterly macroeconomic indicators are: real GDP (“GDP”), real con-
sumption (“Cons”), real investment (“Inv”), real wage (“Wage”), GDP deflator
(“P”), hours worked (“Hours”) and the federal funds rate (“FedFunds”). All vari-
ables are expressed in log difference (“dl”) except one variable, hours worked which
is in logarithm (“l”) and the federal funds rate which is not transformed. Please
refer to the Online Appendix for a detailed description of the data.
Our survey measure is the GDP deflator from the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters (SPF), which is collected quarterly. Our sample stretches from the begin-
ning of the SPF survey 1968:4 until 2008:2.12 Figure 2 plots the median SPF infla-
tion survey, we denote this series by “P SPF”. The survey series is log-differenced,
similarly to the real GDP deflator data, to express one-quarter-ahead expectations.
We use only the GDP deflator survey data because all other SPF data has either
been collected only from a later date or is not a forward variable in our model.13
10For more on optimal adaptive algorithms see Benveniste, Me´tivier, and Priouret (1990).
11Branch and Evans (2006) examines inflation and GDP surveys.
12This sample period is about the same as the SW sample, but slightly shorter.
13Personal consumption expenditures, and residential and nonresidential fixed investment were
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3.2 Estimation details
In this subsection we describe the state-space representation of the DSGE model
that we estimate with Kalman filter. Our measurement equations that relate our
macroeconomic data to the variables of the model under both RE and CG-LS
(apart from the measurement equation of survey data) are
dl GDPt
dl Const
dl Invt
dl Waget
l Hourst
dl Pt
Fed Fundst

=

γ¯
γ¯
γ¯
γ¯
l¯
p¯i
r¯

+

yˆt − yˆt−1
cˆt − cˆt−1
iˆt − iˆt−1
wˆt − wˆt−1
lˆt
pˆit
Rˆt

, (8)
where γ¯ is the common quarterly trend growth rate, l¯ is steady state hours worked,
p¯i is the steady state quarterly inflation rate and r¯ is the steady state quarterly
nominal interest rate.
3.2.1 Estimations under RE
Under RE the law of motion of the exogenous shocks (2) and the solution under
RE (3) form a state-space representation of the DSGE model. When we use survey
data along with macro data, we supplement (8) with an additional measurement
equation for expectations:
dl P SPFt,t+1 = p¯i + Etpˆit+1 + ζt = p¯i + Φ
RE
1,pi Yt + Φ
RE
2,pi et + ζt, (9)
where dl P SPFt,t+1 is the log difference of SPF inflation expectations from quarter t
to t+ 1, ΦRE1,pi and Φ
RE
2,pi are the rows of the RE model solution (3) that correspond
to inflation and ζt is an i.i.d. measurement error. The interpretation of (9) is that
survey data is viewed as a noisy measure of model-consistent rational expectations.
When survey data is used as an observable, it introduces cross-equation re-
strictions: agents’ rational inflation expectations have to explain not only the
model equations containing inflation expectations (Phillips curve, consumption
Euler equation, wage equation and equation for the value of the capital stock),
but also the SPF survey.
We assume that agents use the Kalman filter to estimate latent variables. These
include some endogenous variables, because they are not in our dataset, as well as
the exogenous shocks.
collected only from 1981. Real GDP expectations can be constructed from 1968 but it are not a
forward variable in our model. We use only SPF, because it is the longest survey. The Michigan
survey is ten years shorter than the SPF and the Livingstone survey is only biannual.
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3.2.2 Estimations under learning
When we model agents with CG-LS, the state-space representation of the model
consists of the law of motion of the stochastic shocks (2) and the solution under
CG-LS (7).
Our forward variables are inflation, consumption, investment, hours worked,
real wages, real rental rate on capital and the value of the capital stock. To
determine a CG-LS forecasting model (5-6)for each of these we respond to a general
criticism of non-rational expectations, namely the abundance of forecasting models
available to chose from. We explain the details below.
We use survey data to discipline the model choice for inflation expectations.
We search for the CG-LS model that provides the best fit to the survey data in
terms of one-quarter-ahead out-of-sample forecasts. Our method is explained in
detail in section 4.1. We estimate initial conditions for the CG-LS recursion from
presample data.
For other forward variables we do not have survey data we therefore model CG-
LS agents to be as close as possible to the RE equilibrium. We assume that agents
use the correct minimum state variable (MSV) representation (3) to estimate their
regressions, i.e. they condition their expectations on the same information set as
rational agents, but they do not know the coefficients of the RE equilibrium and
therefore have to estimate it. This way we do not make ad-hoc assumptions about
these expectations, but use the RE model solution instead.14 In our model this
implies that agents use a state vector containing 20 variables, many of which are
unobserved (latent). We follow Slobodyan and Wouters (2012) and assume that
learning agents are similar to RE agents, and use the Kalman filter recursion to
generate estimates of the latent variables. We set β0 equal to the coefficients of the
RE solution (3) and the initial condition of R0 equal to the unconditional second
moments resulting from the RE solution. In the estimations we implement this by
solving for the RE equilibrium for each draw of parameters during the Bayesian
estimation.15 Note that if the estimated tracking parameter is zero, the CG-LS
coefficients are never updated and stay equal to their initial RE value, thus learning
forecasts are identical to the RE forecasts. If the estimated tracking parameter is
14Strictly speaking, expectations that are rational in the RE model are not rational when
inflation expectations are CG-LS. RE within the model should take into account that inflation
is formed with CG-LS learning. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this
out.
15We opted not to estimate the initial conditions together with the other coefficients, because
it would increase the number of parameters we have to estimate. Also, treating initial conditions
as free parameters to be estimated might be problematic because initial conditions might end
up explaining a too large portion of the model fit. (See Carboni and Ellison (2009) citing Sims’
critique of Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2004).) For a paper estimating the initial conditions, see
Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2004), Slobodyan and Wouters (2012).
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non-zero, new data affects the βt estimates (through the learning recursion (5)-6))
and learning forecasts would deviate from the RE forecasts. This way learning
introduces new long-run perpetual dynamics, different from that of RE.
Since we are modeling inflation expectations and expectations of other for-
ward variables differently, we have two sets of the CG-LS recursions (5-6) and we
estimate a different tracking parameter for each.
In the estimations using the SPF inflation survey as observable, we estimate a
new measurement equation for expectations:
dl P SPFt,t+1 = p¯i + E
LS
t pit+1 + ζt, (10)
where ELSt pit+1 is the row corresponding to inflation in learning agents’ expectation,
equation (4).16 The interpretation of equation (10) is that we treat SPF inflation
survey as a noisy measure of CG-LS inflation expectations.
When survey data is used as an observable in the estimations of the learning
model, the model solution under learning (7) and the measurement equation of
inflation expectations (10) both depend on the CG-LS coefficient estimates. This
introduces similar cross-equation restrictions as the estimation under RE: agents’
inflation expectations have to explain not only those model equations that contain
inflation expectations but also the SPF survey.17
3.3 Parameters, priors and Bayesian estimation
The structural model contains 38 parameters. We estimate 33 of these and for the
remaining five we follow SW and use calibrated values.18 In the learning estimation
we have two additional parameters (the gain for inflation expectations and the gain
for all other expectations). In estimations using survey data the standard deviation
of the measurement error of expectations ζt is an extra parameter.
The prior distributions of the structural parameters are the same as in SW (see
Table 3). We use uniform distributions over the [0,1) domain for the gains and an
inverse gamma distribution with a zero mean and a standard deviation of two for
the standard deviation of ζt.
16 We implicitly assume that inflation and survey expectations have the same steady state.
17 Ireland (2003) advocated deriving cross-equation restrictions under learning in the same
way as under RE. Another example is Carboni and Ellison (2009) who introduce cross-equation
restrictions in a model where the central bank is using Kalman filter to learn about the Phillips
curve.
18The calibrated parameters are: depreciation rate, exogenous spending-GDP ratio, steady-
state mark-up in the labor market and two parameters of the function that aggregates differen-
tiated labor and output (see Appendix for values.). The first two of these are difficult to identify
in estimations, while the last three are not identified (see SW.).
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The DSGE model is estimated using Bayesian estimation methods. Employing
the random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, we obtain 250 000 draws from
each model’s posterior distribution. The first half of these draws is discarded, and
one out of every ten remaining draws is selected to estimate the moments of the
posterior distributions.
4 Results
In this section we describe how we use the SPF survey to select the CG-LS model
for inflation expectations (4.1), we then show our main results in (4.2) and discuss
parameter estimates and impulse response functions in (4.2.2).
4.1 Forecasting models for inflation
To determine the CG-LS model for inflation expectations, we search for the model
that generates fictional out-of-sample inflation forecasts that are the closest to the
SFP inflation survey.
Let us denote the set of possible forecasting models by ΩX and an element,
one specific model, by X i. For each forecasting model X i and tracking parameter
g we generate one-quarter-ahead CG-LS inflation forecasts in the following way.
First, we use presample estimates of the model to set the initial conditions for
the learning recursion. We have chosen a long presample, 1950:1-1968:3, to avoid
over sensitivity of the initial presample estimates of β0, R0. The end point 1968:3
is given by the start of the SPF data. In the next step, from 1968:4 onwards
we use new data and the learning recursion (5-6) to update β and then generate
one-period-ahead forecasts. 19 We choose the value of g and the set of regressors
X i that generate inflation forecasts closest in mean squared deviation from the
survey expectations:
argmin
05g<1,Xi∈ΩX
T∑
t=1
(
piet,t+1(g,X
i)− dl P SPFt,t+1
)2
, (11)
Where 1...T is the survey sample 1968:4-2008:2 and dl P SPFt,t+1 is the survey measure
of one-period-ahead inflation expectations conducted at time t.
19As previously discussed, agents use the current quarter’s data to forecast. In reality survey
respondents do not know the current quarterly data, but have a good estimate of it. The SPF
survey is conducted in the middle of the quarter, when preliminary data is already published.
Del Negro and Eusepi (2011) examine the importance of this timing assumption and find that
estimation results are not sensitive to it (contemporaneous timing v.s. agents accessing only to
t− 1 data).
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The set of possible regressors consists of all the data we use in the estimations:
dl GDP , dl Cons, dl Inv, dl Wage, dl P , FedFunds, and l Hours. In other
words, we assume that agents have access to the same dataset as we have. We
also include a constant in the set of regressors to account for the fact that actual
inflation is not zero on average.
In total we estimate 127 models, each with a grid of different tracking parame-
ters in [0, 1). The regressors that minimize (11) and provide the best fit to the SPF
inflation survey are lagged inflation and a constant (see Table 1). Even though
this result suggests that professional forecasters use only past inflation to forecast
inflation, we can also see from Table 1 that other forecasting models that include
real economic variables provide a very similar fit. Figure 3 shows that the five best
fitting models are indeed hardly distinguishable, and they all track the time series
of inflation survey well.
Table 1: Ranking of forecasting models for inflation
Rank Regressors Gain MSD
1 dlP 0.125 0.0294
2 dlP lHours 0.113 0.0300
3 dlP dlCons 0.100 0.0302
4 dlP dlCons lHours 0.125 0.0303
5 dlP dlGDP 0.125 0.0315
MSD: mean squared deviation from survey ex-
pectations. The models are estimated by re-
cursive CG-LS. The initial conditions are ob-
tained from the period 1950:1-1968:3. Regres-
sion: dl Pt = β
pi
0 +β
pi
1 regressort−1 Sample period
1968:4-2008:2.
The estimated tracking parameters are high, for the best-fitting model g =
0.12. This suggests that agents use about two years of data for their inflation
forecast.20 On US data smaller gain parameters were estimated in papers that
modeled learning with a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) because VAR learning is
very unstable with a high gain parameter (see Branch and Evans (2006), Milani
(2007), Slobodyan and Wouters (2012)). We find that the small linear forecasting
models in Table 1 do not become unstable with a high g, moreover a high gain
parameter allows for substantial time variability in the learning coefficients that
describes observed inflation expectations well.
20This is calculated with 1/g, which is the halving time of CG-LS, i.e. beyond this period less
than 50% of the data is used for the estimations.
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The generated CG-LS inflation forecasts fit particularly well the increase in
inflation expectations in the 70s, when monetary policy was used to raise inflation
in the belief that there was an exploitable trade-off between inflation and unem-
ployment.21 A high tracking parameter is essential for this fit. Agents’ initial
belief was estimated from a low-inflation presample period and a high g implies
that agents “understand” sooner that in the 70s a new high inflation period has
started; they adjust their expectations more quickly in response to changes in the
data, and inflation expectations converge further away from their initial belief.
Our benchmark CG-LS model for inflation expectations is the best fitting model
ELSt dl Pt+1 = β
pi
0,t−1 + β
pi
1,t−1dl Pt, (12)
where βpi0,t−1 and β
pi
1,t−1 are the time t estimates of the constant and the coefficient
of lagged inflation respectively. As we assume contemporaneous timing, agents use
their time t estimate and the current value of inflation dl Pt to forecast inflation at
t + 1. We use this benchmark specification (12) for our main estimations, and in
the robustness section 5 we examine other forecasting models in Table 1 as well.
4.2 Model fit, model-implied inflation expectations
Our main estimation results are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Model comparison
Dataset Dataset
Log Marginal without with
Likelihood survey data survey data
(1) (2) (3) =(2)-(1)
RE -146.78 -19.14 127.64
Learning -142.82 45.22 188.04
This table shows the log marginal likelihood of the RE and learn-
ing model. Survey data: median of SPF one-quarter-ahead fore-
cast of the GDP deflator.
In the estimations without survey data (column 1) the CG-LS model performs
slightly better, but the difference of log marginal likelihoods is only 3.96 points.22
21 At the same time the unemployment rate increased as well, so the traditional Phillips curve
inflation-output relationship broke down.See more on this and alternative explanations for the
behavior of inflation in the 70s in Cogley and Sargent (2002).
22The difference is even smaller with uniform prior distributions: log marginal likelihood of RE
and learning is -120 and -119.2, respectively. Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008) find that even
a five point difference in the log marginal likelihood can be overturned by choosing a slightly
different prior.
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23 However, when SPF inflation expectations are included among the observables,
the CG-LS model clearly outperforms the RE model (Table 2, column 2). The
difference between their log marginal likelihoods is 64.36 points, which implies a
very high posterior odd of 8.93E+27. This likelihood difference in favor of the
adaptive learning specification is much larger than in earlier studies that did not
use survey data among the observables. For example, in Slobodyan and Wouters
(2009) and (2012) the marginal likelihood of learning is only 10-20 points higher
than that of RE.24 The fact that the difference in the likelihood of the RE and the
learning model increases so much, implies that there is extra information in the
survey as to which model describes the reality best.
Learning outperforms RE due to the flexibility of the learning model of infla-
tion expectations. To illustrate this, Figure 1 plots how much the model-implied
inflation expectations change when survey data is added to the observables. In-
flation expectations implied by the RE model do not change much: differences
in the survey and the model-implied inflation expectations end up mostly in the
error term. Expectations implied by learning, on the other hand, change more and
become closer to the survey data. This provides a better likelihood both because
the survey of inflation expectations is explained better and because, at the same
time, the learning model also fits macro variables well.
The reason behind this flexibility of adaptive learning is the small, linear fore-
casting model of inflation. This small forecasting model is misspecified, and not
consistent with the RE equilibrium, and therefore the model dynamics under learn-
ing and RE are markedly different. In addition, due to the high estimated gain
parameter (see posterior estimates, Table 4), the CG-LS coefficients vary substan-
tially in response to new data and have considerable time variability (see estimated
CG-LS coefficients in Figure 4).
In order to disentangle the effect of a small forecasting model from adaptive
learning we reestimate our DSGE model changing the small forecasting model of
inflation expectations into a model-consistent with the MSV solution under RE.25
In our medium scale DSGE model this implies a large forecasting model. The first
row of Table 5 shows that in estimations with survey data, the learning model
still has a higher log marginal likelihood than RE but, compared to the small
23Whilst previous literature found that modeling agents as learners can improve the likelihood,
we are not surprised that in our estimations this is not the case. As Slobodyan and Wouters
(2012) showed, the likelihood depends on how learning is modeled. In general, learning with
small forecasting models provides a better fit, but we use a small forecasting model only for
learning about inflation.
24 Similarly to us, Del Negro and Eusepi (2011) found that including survey data among the
observables can increase the log marginal likelihood by a similar magnitude. Their analysis is
different than ours because they do not examine adaptive learning.
25We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this estimation.
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Figure 1: Model-implied inflation expectations, with or without survey data in the
database
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model in Table 2, MSV learning worsens the likelihood. MSV learning implies
similar dynamics for inflation expectations as RE, but with more time variability
(Figure 6). Similar to RE, MSV learning fails to capture the increase of inflation
expectations in the 70s and their decline in the 80s. We conclude that learning can
improve the model fit, but a small forecasting model is essential to attain the good
performance. (In section 5 we examine the robustness of this result to changing
the small forecasting model.)
A small forecasting model in itself is not enough for a good model fit, but time
variation of the learning coefficients, caused by the high estimated gain parame-
ter, is also important. To show this we reestimate the model using decreasing-gain
learning (DG-LS) instead of constant-gain learning. Under DG-LS the gain pa-
rameter is decreasing in time, g = 1/t; thus in time the learning recursion reacts
less and less to new data. The second row of Table 5 shows that when we in-
clude survey data among the observables, the likelihood worsens so much that the
RE model now outperforms DG-LS. The intuition behind is that with DG-LS it
takes a long time for the initial conditions to die out (see Figure 6). Since the
initial conditions are obtained during a period of low and not persistent inflation
(period 1950:1-1968:3), the model fails to replicate the increases in SPF inflation
expectations in the 1970s and their substantial decline.
4.2.1 Goodness of fit to inflation survey data
To quantify the fit to observed survey expectations we follow the method of Del Ne-
gro and Eusepi (2011). Let Mi denote the model (solved either under RE or
CG-LS) and Y1,T the set of macroeconomic observables used in the estimation. As
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before, dl P SPF is the one-quarter-ahead SFP inflation forecast (level forecasts are
log differenced). Subindex 1, T denotes the data sample t = 1...T . We are inter-
ested in the posterior likelihood p(dl P SPF1,T |Y1,T ,Mi) that provides information on
how well model Mi estimated with the macroeconomic data Y1,T fits the survey
data. An easy way to compute this quantity is
p(dl P SPF1,T |Y1,T ,Mi) =
p(dl P SPF1,T , Y1,T |Mi)
P (Y1,T |Mi) . (13)
The numerator and the denominator of (13) are reported in logarithm in columns
2 and 1 of Table 2. In column 3 we report the logarithm of (13), which is the
difference of columns 2 and 1. Our result shows that learning clearly outperforms
RE in describing the evolution of the survey data.
Learning fits the survey well on average and it provides a better fit than RE
across time (see Figure 1). In comparison to RE, expectations generated by the
learning model follow the survey much more closely, especially during the period of
high variance in the first half of our sample. This can be explained by the fact that
the learning algorithm estimates a high inflation persistence in the 70s and 80s (see
Figure 4 (a)), therefore learning expectations increase together with inflation in the
70s and decline together with inflation in the 80s Volker era. This pattern describes
survey expectations well with one notable exception. In 1983 the learning model
forecasts a decrease in inflation expectations when in fact the survey expectations
increase due to the uncertainty around Volker’s reappointment by Reagan (coupled
with a high budget deficit). The CG-LS algorithm forecasts a decrease in inflation
expectations, because actual inflation decreased during this time. In other words,
the uncertainty around Volker’s reappointment was an exogenous information that
survey respondents used but CG-LS estimates could not, because this uncertainty
was not visible in the data.
A great advantage of using survey data in the estimations is that it helps to
avoid unrealistic jumps in model-implied inflation expectations. This is more pro-
nounced for learning than for RE (see Figure 1). The estimated coefficients of
CG-LS inflation expectations are smoother when survey data is used as an ob-
servable (Figure 4), which translates into smoother perceived long-run inflation
targets as well (Figure 5). Interestingly, the announcement of the Volker disinfla-
tion did not decrease expectations about long-run inflation right away. Erceg and
Levin (2003) explains this with imperfect information: agents were not able to tell
whether increased interest rates mean the central bank had changed its inflation
target or whether it was just a temporary shock. Our results show that CG-LS
learning is consistent with this story as well: it takes time for agents to revise their
perceived long-run inflation target, because they need enough new data to revise
their estimates.
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4.2.2 Posterior estimates and impulse responses
A general result in the literature is that adaptive learning enhances the propaga-
tion mechanism in DSGE models, but there is disagreement about which nominal
frictions are important to match the dynamics of inflation. Milani (2007) finds
that the structural inertia is systematically reduced when learning is introduced,
while Slobodyan and Wouters (2012) find that this result is not general. We add
to this debate by using the extra information in survey expectations of inflation.
In this section we report how the posterior estimates of those parameters that
directly affect price stickiness change.26 First, let us discuss the RE estimation
results. Comparing columns 1 and 3 in Table 4 we can see that there is extra
information in the inflation survey data as to which propagation channel is impor-
tant. Column (1) presents estimates of the RE model without survey data, which
is the benchmark estimate of SW. Column (3) shows that including inflation sur-
vey in the dataset reduces the importance of price indexation (from a posterior
median of 0.327 to 0.052) and wage stickiness (from 0.554 to 0.468). These pa-
rameter changes affect the inflation impulse responses (Figure 7). The reduction
of wage stickiness causes a less persistent inflation response to the wage mark-up
shock (the stochastic properties of the wage markup shock itself do not change, see
Online Appendix). Interestingly, despite the large reduction in the degree of infla-
tion indexation, inflation’s impulse response to the price mark-up shock does not
change. This happens because the autocorrelation coefficient of the price mark-up
shock increases (from a posterior median of 0.448 to 0.726) and this counteracts
the effect of the smaller price indexation.27
Using survey data in the learning model does not change the parameters, the
only significant parameter change being in the gain parameter of inflation ex-
pectations (compare columns 2 to 4). The posterior mean of the constant gain
parameter is high in both estimations, but the gain parameter decreases from
0.188 to 0.141 when survey data is included in the dataset. As we discussed in
section 4.2, this removes some unrealistic jumps in the evolution of beliefs. Since
the model-implied inflation expectations fit the survey data well (see Figure 1),
using survey data in the estimations does not systematically alter other structural
26Other parameter estimates are so close both with and without survey data that we only
report them in the Online Appendix. These parameter estimates do not change much probably
because expectations (other than inflation) are modeled as consistent with the RE equilibrium.
Estimation results of Slobodyan and Wouters (2009) have shown the same insensitivity of pa-
rameter estimates when learning expectations are consistent with the RE equilibrium.
27We find that impulse responses of other endogenous variables are not affected in estimations
with survey data, therefore we do not report them here. In the Online Appendix we report the
variance-covariance analysis of inflation. We find that the relative importance of different shocks
do not depend on whether the estimation is done with survey data, but depends on how the
learning algorithm of inflation expectations is formulated (see robustness section 5).
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parameters. In other words, modeling inflation expectations with this benchmark
model or using survey data as an observable contains similar information about
the structural parameters.
The impulse response of inflation under learning is a function of the time vary-
ing CG-LS coefficients, therefore it is time varying as well (Figure 8). Using survey
data as an observable makes the CG-LS coefficients less volatile, therefore the im-
pulse responses of inflation are also more stable. Inflation impulse responses are
stronger in the 1970s than in later years. For example, unexpected monetary pol-
icy shocks had a stronger destabilizing effect on inflation during the 1970s than
after (Figure 8 (c)). Similar results were found in Boivin and Giannoni (2006):
inflation responds more strongly to unexpected changes in the interest rate before
1979 than after.
An interesting difference between learning and RE impulse responses is that
inflation under learning has a hump-shaped impulse response to a monetary shock.
As learning is backward-looking, it indirectly introduces lagged inflation into the
Phillips curve, which has been shown to yield a hump-shaped impulse response
function for inflation. The impulse response function of inflation under RE is not
hump-shaped, because of the smaller coefficient of price indexation.
In sum, our results are closer to Slobodyan and Wouters (2012) than to Milani
(2007). We find that not all structural frictions decrease and price indexation even
becomes more important under learning (compare columns 1 and 2 in Table 4).
The importance of different frictions seems to be sensitive to the modeling choice
of learning. We therefore believe that it is really important to reduce our degrees
of freedom in the choice of learning algorithms. We believe our method is a good
way of doing this: using survey data to choose the learning algorithm.28
5 Robustness exercises
In this section we show that our results are robust to changing the small forecasting
model of CG-LS inflation expectations and to changing the prior.
We redo our estimations using survey data, assuming that inflation expecta-
tions are formed with constant-gain learning with alternate forecasting models in
Table 1. The results in Table 6 show that these alternate learning models still have
much higher likelihood than the RE model, although the likelihood is somewhat
smaller than in our benchmark model. Changing the small forecasting model of
inflation expectations barely changes the posterior parameter estimates. To give
an example, the median value of the posterior distribution of the price indexation
is not significantly different from 0.6 neither in the benchmark estimation (Table
28The parameter estimates also depend on whether the DSGE model is small scale (like Milani
(2007)) or medium scale (like Slobodyan and Wouters (2012) and our model).
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4) nor in the robustness estimations (Table 6). Likewise, the gain parameters do
not change significantly compared to the benchmark estimation.
Our results are also robust to changing the priors. We reestimate the models
with loose uniform prior distributions and find that the CG-LS model outperforms
RE when survey data is used among the observables. Parameter estimates are also
robust to changing the priors and price indexation remains low in the RE model
when survey data is among the observables (see Online Appendix).
6 Conclusion
The message of our paper is that using survey data of inflation provides useful
information not present in macro data as to how to model private expectations.
We contrast RE with adaptive learning and find that the data favors adaptive
learning, but only when learning is modeled with a a small forecasting model. A
small learning forecasting model conditions on a smaller information set than RE,
therefore the model dynamics are also different to those of the RE model. We show
that this simultaneously explains the evolution of the SPF inflation survey and the
dynamics of US macro data. A further advantage of using inflation survey data as
one of the observables is that it helps to prevent unrealistic jumps in model-implied
inflation expectations.
Combining inflation survey data with DSGE models opens up a new avenue for
examining expectation formation. It is possible to examine other information con-
tained in surveys or a wider set of assumptions about expectations. For example,
one can use surveys on other macroeconomic variables, or use individual surveys
to exploit more information than the mean, and one could combine surveys about
the expectations of the central bank with those of the private sector in a monetary
model. Another promising extension to our research would be to impose rational-
ity bounds on adaptive learning as suggested by Marcet and Nicolini (2003). We
leave these interesting extensions for future research.
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Tables and Figures
Table 3: Prior distributions of structural parameters
Symbol Distribution Mean Std.
Share of capital in production α Normal 0.30 0.05
Inv. Elasticity of Intertemporal substitution σc Normal 1.50 0.38
Fix cost in production Φ Normal 1.25 0.13
Adjust cost of investment S′′ Normal 4.00 1.50
Habits in consumption η Beta 0.70 0.10
Wage stickiness ξw Beta 0.50 0.10
Inv. Elast. labor supply σl Normal 2.00 0.75
Price stickiness ξp Beta 0.50 0.10
Wage indexation ιw Beta 0.50 0.15
Price indexation ιp Beta 0.50 0.15
Capital utilization elasticity ψ Beta 0.50 0.15
Taylor rule: response to inflation rpi Normal 1.50 0.25
Taylor rule: response to lagged interest rate ρR Beta 0.75 0.10
Taylor rule: response to changes in output r∆y Normal 0.13 0.05
Trend growth rate y¯ Normal 0.40 0.10
Steady state of inflation p¯i Gamma 0.63 0.10
Steady state of hours worked l¯ Normal 0.00 2.00
Steady state of nominal int rate r¯ Gamma 1.15 0.30
Autocorrelation coef. Price Mk up shock ρp Beta 0.50 0.20
Autocorrelation coef. Wage Mk up shock ρw Beta 0.50 0.20
Autocorrelation coef. Product. Shock ρa Beta 0.50 0.20
Autocorrelation coef. Risk premium shock ρb Beta 0.50 0.20
Autocorrelation coef. Government shock ρg Beta 0.50 0.20
Autocorrelation coef. Investment-Specific shock ρq Beta 0.50 0.20
Autocorrelation coef. Monet policy shock ρr Beta 0.50 0.20
Correlation Government and productivity shocks ρga Normal 0.50 0.25
Std Price Mk up innovation σp Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00
Std. Wage Mk up innovation σw Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00
Std. Product. Innovation σa Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00
Std. Risk premium innovation σb Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00
Std. Government innovation σb Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00
Std. Inv. Specific innovation σq Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00
Std. Monet policy innovation σr Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00
Gain - others than inflation gnonpi Uniform 0.00 1.00
Gain - inflation gpi Uniform 0.00 1.00
Std. measurement error on expectations σexp Inv. Gamma 0.10 2.00
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Table 4: Posterior distribution statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WITHOUT survey data WITH survey data
RE Learning RE Learning
Parameter Symbol Median Std Median Std Median Std Median Std
Wage stickiness ξw 0.554 0.045 0.547 0.049 0.468 0.043 0.563 0.049
Price stickiness ξp 0.648 0.044 0.481 0.035 0.629 0.058 0.480 0.035
Wage indexation ιw 0.482 0.131 0.314 0.107 0.442 0.124 0.319 0.107
Price indexation ιp 0.327 0.155 0.544 0.108 0.052 0.025 0.515 0.119
TR: inflation rpi 1.666 0.130 1.396 0.116 1.711 0.114 1.398 0.104
TR: lag interest rate ρR 0.760 0.028 0.763 0.028 0.706 0.030 0.777 0.029
TR: change in output r∆y 0.199 0.046 0.203 0.046 0.187 0.044 0.210 0.047
Aut. Price Mk up shock ρp 0.448 0.195 0.140 0.070 0.726 0.078 0.173 0.087
Std. Price Mk up shock σp 0.145 0.026 0.213 0.017 0.112 0.013 0.204 0.014
Gain - inflation gpi 0.188 0.014 0.141 0.009
Gain - others gnonpi 0.031 0.042 0.019 0.031
Measurement exp error σexp 0.265 0.016 0.176 0.010
Log. Mg. Likelihood -146.8 -142.8 -19.1 45.2
This table shows the median and standard deviation of the posterior distributions of the parame-
ters most closely related to inflation dynamics. (TR: coefficients of the Taylor rule.) The Online
Appendix contains the same statistics for the complete list of parameters of the model, their prior
and posterior distributions and a convergence check of the random walk Metropolis-Hastings.
Table 5: Model comparison, estimation using decreasing-gain (DG) learning and
MSV learning
Dataset Dataset
Log Marginal without with
Likelihood survey data survey data
(1) (2) (3)=(2)-(1)
MSV learning -131.9 -5.0 126.9
DG learning -148.35 -77.20 71.14
This table shows the log marginal likelihood of the RE and learn-
ing model. Survey data: median of SPF one-quarter-ahead fore-
cast of the GDP deflator.
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Figure 2: Inflation, survey data and model-implied expectations under RE
(Database without survey data)
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The model-implied inflation expectations are obtained using the Kalman-filtered estimates at
each set of parameter values that conforms the posterior distributions. The grey and black areas
represent the distance between the 5th and 95th percent confidence bands.
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Figure 3: Inflation forecasts and survey data of inflation expectations
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Figure 4: Time variation in the learning coefficients of inflation expectations
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1 dl Pt−1. (Best fitting model to SPF inflation survey.)
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Figure 5: Time variation of learning agents’ perceived inflation target
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1 dl Pt−1. (Best fitting model to SPF inflation survey.) Perceived
inflation target βpi0 /(1− βpi1 ).
Figure 6: Model-implied inflation expectations, with or without survey in the
database
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Figure 7: Impulse responses of inflation, RE model
‐0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Without survey data
With survey data
(a) Wage mark-up shock
‐0.1
‐0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Without survey data
With Survey data
(b) Price mark-up shock
‐0.12
‐0.1
‐0.08
‐0.06
‐0.04
‐0.02
0
0.02
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Without survey data
With survey data
(c) Monetary policy shock
The plot shows impulse responses of inflation to price and wage markup shocks in the RE model
(dataset with and without inflation survey).
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Figure 8: Impulse responses of inflation, learning model
Dataset without inflation survey Dataset with inflation survey
(a) Wage mark-up shock
(b) Productivity shock
(c) Monetary policy shock
The plot shows impulse responses of inflation to price and wage markup shocks in the RE model
(dataset with and without inflation survey). Impulse responses are a function of the time varying
learning coefficients.
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